in the case of Tibetans more than in the case of the Mongols and Turks.

While the attitude of the average Northwest Chinese is rather indifferent to national problems, at least as long as his economic position is not unfavorably affected, his approach to individual problems is characterized by a distinct realism and opportunism.

The provinces of Kansu and Shensi, almost exclusively populated by Chinese, are, in comparison with the provinces of China proper, less progressive in regard to education and general living standard; therefore the frontier Chinese is more conservative but also more suspicious and distrustful when faced with innovations and reforms. He relies more upon himself, seeking and expecting less help from the bureaucracy.

Generally speaking, the frontier Chinese can be divided into the following groups: the descendants of those who were exiled and ostracized for political reasons during the Manchu period, further on, the descendants of criminals who were sent to the frontier areas as workmen, and last but not least, the colonist (the overwhelming majority), partly adventurers and desperados and partly surplus population of China proper and finally descendants of former garrison troops and merchants from China proper who were condemned to frontier service, desparately looking for new cultivable land.

Among the Chirese of the Northwest, those living in Shensi and Kansu belong to the oldest settlers. Detached and severed from his old homeland, the frontier Chinese is more versatile and more open-minded towards unusual and unaccustomed situations. The old Confucian ethics in regard to family life and relationship with neighbors is still very strong.

The frontier Chinese is possessed by a romantic feeling for his old country. His position at an outpost in a remote area makes him see the old homeland in an euphemistic light.

The frontier Chinese has to prove true and to stand the test more than the Chinese of China proper, which creates a healthy measure of self criticism without falling into the neurotic error of self-laceration. The frontier Chinese is difficult to influence since he is more unrestrained and less bound to his environment than the Chinese of China proper.

The obvious propagandistic success of the Communists in the Northwest does not contradict the above-mentioned phenomena, because the Communistic propaganda proceeds in an atmosphere of terror and the Chinese, as a born realist and opportunist, inclines to rationalize his pretended acceptance of propaganda.

HISTORICAL SETTING

I. General History of Relations with China

Northwest China, once a major administrative region of Communist China, is an arbitrary political union of widely dissimilar geographical areas inhabited by a conglomeration of diverse ethnic groups. At the eastern end of this vast wedge-shaped region is Shensi, which has been an integral part of China Proper throughout history and is inhabited almost exclusively by Chinese. Although it is only one-seventeenth of the total area, this single province holds almost half of the population of the Northwest. Sian, the provincial seat of Shensi, has been in centuries past and still is today China's political and military base for the control of the Northwest and has been the center for the diffusion of Chinese culture to the Northwest in the past and of Communist ideology in the present.

At the western end of the Northwest region of China is the province of Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan. Its territory occupies half the area of the Northwest but its population is only a seventh of the total. Three-quarters of the inhabitants are Uighurs, a people Turkic in speech and Moslem in religion. The rest is divided among thirteen nationalities.

In the north is the now abolished province of Ninghsia, inhabited largely by Mongols. In the south is Chinghai (also known as Kokonor) with a heterogeneous population of Mongols, Chinese and Tibetans. The Gobi Desert, which pushes south to Ninghsia, and the highlands of Chinghai constrict the habitable area into an hourglass shape, forming a corridor connecting Shensi in the east and Sinkiang in the west. This is the province of Kansu.

A. The Role of the Kansu Panhandle

All traffic between China Proper and Turkestan has been funnelled through the narrow confines of this corridor. The ancient Silk Road started from its terminus at Sian (known in the past as Ch'ang-an) and wound its way, via the Kansu Corridor, into Chinese Turkestan where it branched into the northern and southern routes to bypass the towering Tienshan Mountains. The conquering armies of Han, T'ang and Ch'ing had marched out through this narrow passageway to assert the political rule of China over the desert wastes and oasis towns of Turkestan. Hordes of nomads, lured by the lush plains and opulent cities of China, have poured through this funnel to raid and pillage and, when successful, to found militaristic kingdoms. This was the route worn deep by the trudging feet of camel caravans bearing the tea and silk and porcelain of China to bazaars in the Near East and even to the markets of Byzantium and Rome. In the train of these caravans travellers have come into China, from the Buddhist missionary, Kumarajiva,

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civilization. The former provinces of Ninghsia, Chinghai, and Sinkiang are China's frontier dependencies. While Ninghsia was part of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang is the homeland of the Turkic peoples, Chinghai forms a transitional area between the Tibetans and Mongols on the southwest and northeast as well as between the Chinese and Uighurs in the southeast and northwest repsectively. Although these borderlands were first brought under China's political control during the Han Dynasty at the beginning of the Christian Era, their political ties to China were not consolidated until recently.

In order to check Tzarist Russia's aggression towards Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) after her occupation of the Ili valley, China sent an expedition under General Tso Tsung-t'ang in 1871 to reconquer the region and to make it a province under the name of Sinkiang (literally "New Dominion") in 1881.

In view of Russia's continued southward encroachment from Siberia upon Outer Mongolia and Britain's from India northward to Tibet during the Chinese Revolution at the end of the Manchu Dynasty in 1910-1912, China carved Ninghsia out of Inner Mongolia and Chinghai out of greater Tibet, thereby creating two special districts with Yin-chuan and Hsi-ning as their centers under the provincial administration of Kansu in 1913. By 1928, they were made into two separate provinces. However, quite unexpectedly, following the formation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomy, the province of Ninghsia was abolished and has been added to Kansu province in 1955. (In May 1956 the Alashan and Edsingol regions have been detached from Kansu province and incorporated into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Precise boundary demarcations are not yet known.) Although the political control over these frontier dependencies of Sinkiang, Chinhai, and Ninghsia has been strengthened gradually by the subsequent changes of their administrative status in relation to China, they still remain as "pale" areas in the distribution of Chinese population and culture. That is, the inhabitants of these borderlands are essentially ethnic minority peoples such as Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs, Monguors, Khirgiz, Kazakhs, etc. They are non-han Chinese peoples with an increasing touch of Chinese cultural influence and an increasing number of Chinese elements among the various native groups.

The annexation of these frontier territories to China has brought about an artificial connection between the Chinese and the non-Han Chinese minority peoples, both nomads and settlers. Until now, the natives do not seem to have been influenced much by administrative unity. Not much sympathy is exchanged between the Chinese and Lamaist Tibetan or Mongol; even less

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Major Regions	Population (1953 Census)
Southwest China	98,193,000
Northwest China	35,338,000

In the distribution of population densities, the Northwest is not comparable with other major regions except Tibet and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region as the following indicates:

Major Regions	Average Density per Sq. Mi.
Northwest	28.6
North	623.0
Northeast	214.0
Central and South	400.0
Southwest	222.0
Tibet & Shangtu Area	3.0
IMAR	17.0
Whole country	160.0

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162 Of the 35.3 million people of the Northwest, 28.8 million are found in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu, only 6.5 million in Chinghai and Sinkiang. This contrast between the true Han-Chinese occupied eastern part and the multi-minority peopled western portion is sufficient to portray the unevenness of the population distribution. It becomes even more obvious when this distribution is expressed in terms of the size of the land occupied. Shensi and Kansu, including Ninghsia, have an area of 313,801 square miles which gives an average density of ninety-one persons per square mile, while Chinghai and Sinkiang have an area of 1,010,000 square miles with a density of 6.5 per square mile. The density of the eastern portion without Ninghsia would be increased to 126 persons per square mile, for Ninghsia has at most 800,000 people in an area of about 91,500 square miles. However, the larger density of Shensi and Kansu without Ninghsia is still below the average of the country.

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161 241 Broadly speaking, apart from the general uneven distribution between the eastern and western parts of the region, their distribution displays a special pattern. To the southeast of Nan-shan and Alashan mountain ranges and within the mid-drainage of the Yellow River and the Han-chung Basin, people are concentrated in the fertile valley plains where irrigation is possible, and also in the terrace dry lands of the Liu-pan hills where the annual rainfall is generally below fifteen but above ten inches which, though hardly adequate, is sufficient for growing millet, kaoliang, and even some spring wheat. Population is spread out more evenly in large expanses such as the Han-chung Basin, Wei-ho valley plain, and around Lanchou, a confluent basin where the Tatung, Huang-shui and T'ao-ho converge on the Yellow River, or in long stretches as in southeast Ninghsia between the Alashan Range and the Yellow River course.

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provinces of Northwest China. How much resulted from natural increase and how much is due to recent immigration, is hard to say, because there are no available data. Nevertheless, judged by some current information, the large increase of population of Shensi and Kansu is probably due more to natural increase than to immigration, while the cause for the relatively small increase of Chinghai and Sinkiang is perhaps just the opposite.

D. Distribution of Population by Provinces, Ethnic Groups, Occupation, and Urban Centers:

(See Table XIV.)

Before the abolition of Ninghsia in 1955, its population was less than 800,000 living in an area of about 90,000 square miles with a density of about eight persons per square mile. At that time, the density of former Kansu Province was eighty per square mile. Thus the average population density of Chinghai, Sinkiang, and former Ninghsia would be about the same, seven to eight persons per square mile.

Shensi: The population of Shensi Province is predominantly Chinese, concentrated in the Han-chung Basin and the Wei-ho Valley Plain. The former is in the southern part of the Province, drained by the upper Han River flowing into the Yangtze at Kankow. The latter is in the east central part of the Province, drained by the Wei-ho which enters the Yellow River above Tungkuan. The Han-chung Basin and Wei-ho Plain are the two most densely peopled areas of the province of Shensi and the whole Northwest Region. Northern Shensi is hilly and mountainous. It is more thinly populated. There are about four million Mohammedans or Chinese Moslems known as Dungans. They are distributed more in the northwestern part of the province. In addition, a small number of Mongols are found near the Ordos in the north.

Kansu: The former province of Kansu is fairly populated and known as the "Secondary Homeland" of the Moslems in China. The number of Dungans amounts to nearly one third, while the true or Han-Chinese account for about one half of the total population of the province. The rest are Mongols and "Fan" natives. The Mongols are distributed mostly in the former Ninghsia Province; there are the Alashan Mongols scattered in the desert of Alashan in the east, and the Ölöt (Oirat) Mongols along the Ta-hei-ho or Jo-shui or the Edsin River in the west. The "Fan" natives are found in the southwest close to Chinghai Province. They are related to the Tibetan family. Thus they are often called Hsi-Fan or Western Fan or Tsang-fan, the Tibetan natives. The Shero-Yögur, Sarigh-Uighur and Monguor form smaller minority groups.

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162 Chinghai: The total population of Chinghai province is just over one and a half million. Althoug it is the smallest in number it is the most varied in composition, and it is the most unevenly distributed. About two thirds of the total population live in the few counties of the Hsi-ning district along the Huang-shui (Hsi-ning-ho) and Ta-tung and the main upper Yellow River in the eastern part of the province. These counties originally belonged to Kansu and were added to Chinghai when the province was formed in 1928. The remaining third is widely scattered. As a result of the territorial shift in provincial administration, the population of Chinghai is predominantly Chinese. The Chinese and Dungans plus some Moslems (Salars) are distributed mainly in the eastern portion of the province. According to a questionable report some 25,000 Salars have recently moved from Sinkiang into the province of Chinghai. Also a small group of Kazakh have recently migrated into Chinghai. Some of them are found in the extreme Northwestern part of the province, bordering Sinkiang.

The next important elements are the "Fan" or Tibetans and Mongols. The Tibetan "Fan" are found in the higher parts of the province, such as the Nan-shan Mountain Belt in the north and the Ta-chi-shih massif in the southeast and Yu-shu district, or open plateau areas south of the Baian Khara divide, drained by the upper Yangtze River. The Mongols, Monguors (Tu-jen) and Oirats are found essentially in the upland basins of Tsaidam and Koko Nor.

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162 Sinkiang: Sinkiang is the largest province in size, covering one sixth of the country-s total area. It is twelve times larger than the province of Hopei. It has the smallest population among all the provinces except Chinghai . Apart from the north and southwest part of the Dzungarian Basin and the Ili Valley where they are more evenly spread, the people are concentrated in isolated clusters of oases scattered around the Takla Makan Desert in the Tarim Basin. The main portion of the population of Kashgaria or the Tarim Basin is concentrated in these oases at the edge of the desert and along the foot of the encircling mountains. The valleys of the surrounding mountains are occupied by nomads and semi-settled natives leading a pastoral life.

The composition of the 4.8 million population of Sinkiang is most complicated. Sinkiang is known as a "Natural Museum of Ethnology of the World." Here one finds Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Turks, as well as some Indo-Europeans living side by side. As Pevtsov has said: "From the ethnological point of view the natives of Kashgaria resemble a mixture of ancient Aryans of the Iranian branch with Turco-Mongols. By religion they are Sunni Moslems; they are very friendly toward foreigners.

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162 the Ma Chan-shan and other leaders of resistance against the Japanese aggression in Manchuria (See Northeast, History).

The Indo-Europeans are essentially Russians who number about 15,000, and another 9,000 are Tajiks (Sari Kolis or Iranians). They are found mainly in the large towns of Kashgar, Yarkand, Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kuldja, Khotan, Keriya, and Qomul.

N 2. Distribution by Occupation

162 In general, the Northwest is mainly agricultural, and pastoralism prevails in the higher and colder parts of the country. The Chinese and Dungans are essentially agriculturalists with some engaged in trade and industry, besides working as official administrators and soldiers. They live in villages and towns. Among the Turkic people, the Uighurs, (who are commonly called the "Ch'an-t'ou" or "Turan-heads" by the Chinese and to the Russians are the "Sarts" and the Taranchi), are oasis-dwellers, engaged largely in horticulture, animal husbandry and handicraft. The Uzbeks are city dwellers engaged in business and handicraft.

S In regard to the occupation of the people living in Southern
162 Sinkiang, Pevtsov said: "Population of Kashgaria (Tarim Basin) is close to 2,000,000 people. The people are divided into three groups: the settled people , the shepherds and the nomads. The settled population amounts to 1,800,000 people; they inhabit the areas surrounding the desert or the oases. The nomads and the shepherds are not more than 200,000. They occupy the mountainous areas of the encircling mountains." (Pevtsov, M. V.: Puteshestvie V Kashgariiu i Kun-lun, p. 52).

N The Mongols are pastoralists, or semi-nomadic as are
162 the Kazakhs and Kirghiz in Dzungaria and most of them live in the Tsaidam Basin of Chinghai and Hsi-t'ao or Alashan Desert or former Ninghsia province.

S The Manchus of Sinkiang, like the Chinese, are city dwellers.
[162] They are found mainly in Dzungaria and the Ili Valley of north Sinkiang. They are largely merchants and traders - middlemen between the Russians and the Turkic people.

The Tibetans are engaged mainly in mixed farming, animal husbandry and some agriculture, raising some hardy crops for their own use, besides rearing yaks, cattle, some sheep and goats.

Both the old Russian residents and the newly arrived refugees are mainly technical laborers - small artisans, such as electricians, miners, road construction crews, car drivers, etc.

The Tajiks lead a semi-settled and pastoral life.

000 3. Distribution of the Urban Centers (See Table XV) Z A

E. Population Problems

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TABLE XIII. Population Increase of the Northwestern Provinces.

Province	Population (1946 Nanking Govt.)	Population (1953 C.P. Census)	Differential Increase
Shensi	9,956,055	15,881,281	5,925,226
Kansu	6,528,726)		
Ninghsia	721,518)	12,928,102	5,677,858
Chinghai	1,384,956	1,676,534	291,578
Sinkiang	3,730,051	4,873,608	1,143,557
	22,321,306	35,359,525	13,038,219

TABLE XIV. Distribution of Population by Provinces, and Their Average Densities

Province	Population (1953 census)	Area in sq. mi.	Density
Shensi	15,881,281	72,618	219
Kansu (incl. Ninghsia)	12,928,102	241,183	54
Chinghai	1,676,534	257,553	7
Sinkiang	4,873,608	660,805	7
TOTAL	35,359,525	1,232,159	28.6

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Sinkiang All

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TABLE XV. Distribution of the Urban Centers

Province	Cities	Approx. Population	General Remarks
Shensi	Sian	560,000 (1951)	Administrative & Industrial Center
	Nan-cheng(Han-cheng)	50,000 (1951)	Commercial
	T'ung-kuan	10,000 (1951)	Strategic
Kansu	Lan-chow (Kao-lan)	150,000 (1951)	Adm. & Trade Center
	Yin-chuan (Ninghsia)	80,000 (1951)	Capital of former Ninghsia Province
	Hsia-ho (Labrang)	5,000	Lamasery:religious center
Chinghai	Hsi-ning	50,000 (1951)	Admin. & Trade Center
Sinkiang	Urumchi (Tihua)	80,000 (1951)	Capital, strategic, com'l. & industrial center
	Chitai (Ku-cheng-tze)	30,000 (1931)	Wool Trade center
	Kuldja (I-ning)	30,000 (1931)	Com'l. center, built by Chinese 1762
	Turfan	100,000 (1931)	Com'l. center
	Kashgar (Shu-fu)	80,000	Industrial & com'l. center.

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162 7 Chinese 210 scattered all over Sinkiang, the bulk being in the triangle of Charchlike, Hami and Kuldja
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8	Dungans	100	the same as No. 7
9	Olots	15	on the Tekes River and Kashr.
10	Torguts	18	in the Tien-Shan between Kuldja and Karashar, on the tributaries of the Black Irtysh
11	Khoshuts	21	in the Altai in the area of Chuguchak and along the Yuldus River
12	Chakhar	8	in the Borokhoro mountains
13	Urianghai	4	in the Altai, in the area of Chuguchak
14	Russians	15 - 16	live in the cities only, mainly in Kashgar, Yarkend, Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kuldja, Guma, Khotan, Keriya and Qumul
15	Tajiks	9	the main bulk lives at the Sinkiang-Afghanistan border, especially in the towns of Ktash Qurghan and Yanighissar

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162 **B. The Ethnic Groups of Kansu**
131 The main racial group in the province of Kansu is the Chinese
361 who number more than twelve million. Other ethnic groups are the Mongours (Mongols), the Turks (Salars and Sarigh-Uighurs), and finally the Tibetans.

Number	Group	Number of people in thousands	Areas in which they live
1	Chinese	10,500	everywhere within the province

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No.	Group	No. of People (in thousands)	Areas in which they live
2	Chinese Moham-medans	1,500	Mostly in the northern and western part of the province
3	Mongours	30	In the area which is enclosed by the Pingfan River, Tatung River, Hsining River and the Yellow River westward of Lanchou
4	Tibetans	40	scattered over the area which is enclosed by the Ping-fan River, Tatung River, Hsining River and the Yellow River
5	Sarigh-Uighur	5	on the northern slopes of the Nanshan, south of Su-chou
6	Mongols (Torguts and Ölöts)	?	The Torguts live in the area west and east of the Edsin gol and north of the line Ansi Su-chou. The Ölots live in the Alashan, north of Kan-chou and Liang-chou and the Chukhushan mountains, also north of the Lu ng-shan.

C. The Ethnic Groups of Chinghai

The main racial groups in the province of Chinghai are the Chinese, the Tibetans, the Chinese Moslems, the Salar Turks, the Mongols (Ölöts from Alashan) and the Mongours or Tu-jen.

No.	Group	No. of People (in thousands)	Areas in which they live
1	Chinese	576	Mainly in the southeastern part of Chinghai, also along the Nan-shan mountain region, bordering Kansu and Sinkiang
2	Tibetans	417	In the Kuku-nor area, in the Dang-la mountain range and at the headw ters of the Yellow River

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No.	Group	No. of People (in thousands)	Areas in which they live
3	Chinese Moslems	138	In the capital Hsining (49,000) in the districts of Ta-tung, Huang-chung, Huang-yuan, Min-huo, Hua-lung, Hsun-hua, Meng-yuan, Also in the cities of Ho-chow and Lin-hsia.
4	Salars (Turks)	50	In the area of Hsun-hua, south of the Yellow River, and around Payen-Jung, southeast of Hsining.
5	Mongols	33	In the area north of the Kuku-nor, south and north of the Tsaidam swamps and in the area of the Bayan Kara Shan mountain range.
6	Mongours	72	West of the Kuku-nor in the area of the tributaries of the Ta-tung River, Hsining River. Some of them live south of the Yellow River around Kuei-te.

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6) Muru Dzasak, 40 families, (Tafel: Da-tung Dzasak)
7) Charagolchin Dzasak, 4 families (Tafel: presumably Damba Dzasak)
8) Baga-nor Dzasak, 1 family (Tafel: ?)
9) Khalkha Dzasak, 3 families (Tafel: ?)
10) Tsunkuk Dzasak, 60 families (Tafel: probably Tsinkuk Gung)
11) Barun Dzasak, 280 families (Tafel: Barun)
12) Tsun Dzasak, 300 families (Tafel: Dzun)

3. Probable extinction

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According to M. Hermanns, the total population of the Chinghai Mongols does not exceed 18,000 people. Since the Mongols of the Chinghai region have very few children - two at the most - and since sinification as well as Tibetanization appears to be rapid, the extinction of the Chinghai Mongols is to be expected in the near future.

IV. The Tibetans of the Northwest

A. General Characteristics

The province of Chinghai is inhabited by sixty-six Tibetan tribes, called by the Chinese "tame" in contrast to the "wild" tribes inhabiting the Kokonor region.

Lattimore and Father Schram point out that the Tibetan tribes easily subdivide into new tribes which observe strict clan exogamy. The Tibetans are Lamaist-Buddhists of the Yellow Hat Sect in the northern districts and of the Red Hat Sect in the southern districts. Shamanism is also still existant among the Tibetans. Some Tibetans living in the district of Hsün-hua have become Moslems.

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B. Physical Characteristics

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The Tibetans belong to a race which is called protosinide. Their characteristic features are: middle to tall stature and very muscular. The legs are considerably longer than the legs of the Mongoloids. The color of the skin is light brown and the facial skin copperish red. The lips are thin. The nose is long and prominent. The head is large and long. Round heads appear only among the Ngo-loks. The face shows a sharp relief. Usually they lack the Mongoloid eyefold. Eye color is generally brown. Body hair is considerably stronger, thicker and denser than among the Chinese or Mongols.

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C. Economic Activities

The Tibetans are either nomads who breed yaks and sheep or farmers who cultivate oats, peas, wheat, cabbage, and turnips. They use the same agricultural tools as the Chinese farmers.

V. The Chinese Moslems

*563 795 A. Population

According to Paul Cwick, there are about 100,000 Chinese Moslems living in Sinkiang, about 300,000 in Ning-hsia, about [162] 1,500,000 in Kansu and about 138,000 in Chinghai. For China as a whole the total figure amounts to 3,599,350.

1. Physical characteristics and economic activities

*563 795 144 142 The overwhelming majority of Chinese Moslems seem to be of Chinese extraction, but undoubtedly there are Chinese Moslems of Turkish and Indo-European extraction. The latter origin can be deduced from statements made by Father Cwick. He says that many Chinese Moslems of Chinghai have blond hair, blue eyes and prominent eagle-noses. Filchner says that the Hui-hui (the Chinese term for the Moslems) are different from the Chinese, having taller and stronger bodies, oval skull shape and prominent noses. *563 795 181 Fuad Kazak states that the Chinese Moslems (also called Dungans) also differ from the Chinese in terms of their martial tendencies. Certainly their numerous uprising affirm this statement. Father Schram reports some Chinese sayings about the Chinese Moslems: "One Moslem asleep is more intelligent than ten wide awake Chinese," or; "The food of the Moslems is tasteful, but their words are not to be trusted," and "out of ten Moslems nine are thieves." All report concordantly that the Chinese Moslems are very eager, keen, shrewd, and successful traders and merchants, farmers [441] and innkeepers. They are known for their skilled salesmanship "in the grain trade and the buying and selling of horses, mules, oxen, sheep, wool, hides and lamb skins." (Schram) [505] The Chinese Moslems also have a near monopoly on the boat and raft traffic of the upper course of the Yellow River.

2. Religion

*563 795 771 Some of the Chinese Moslems believe in the Sunna tradition and part believe in the Shia. Many Chinese Moslems still exercise Sufism (mystical submergence into the idea of God, mystical meditations and so forth). While the Sunna-believers stick to the traditional Islamic interpretation and the commandments of the Koran, the Shia-believers do not recognize hereditary religious leadership. Since everybody "who is graced by God" can become a religious leader, the Shia believers are split into many groups.

3. Relations with other groups

a. Chinese

*563 795 186 The Chinese consider the Chinese Moslems as foreigners and even barbarians. The animosity between these two groups is extraordinarily violent. The Chinese Moslems have never missed an occasion to annihilate the Chinese as, for instance, in the second half of the eighteenth century when the northwest of China

*563 184 628 325 439 476 Moslem enterprise and Chinese skill. For example, not many years ago in Tao-chou Old City, Kansu, there was an extensive industry of casting brazen pots and kettles for the Tibetan trade. The metal used was from old Chinese square-holed coin that is no longer used. This coinage was bought up and transported by small Moslem trader-muleteers and then sold to the Chinese artisans, who did the casting. The finished product was sold again to the Moslems, who took it into the Tibetan country as an article of trade. Thus, by Moslem enterprise a market was found for the product of Chinese skill, which kept the foundry fires going a good part of the year. However, this cooperative effort would be interrupted by the frequent disputes between the Moslems and the Chinese authorities. In the rural towns and urban cities the

*563 184 628 369 463 general pattern of division of occupations and vocations is that the Moslems follow the more adventurous subsidiary callings, which require more hardship and daring. Such occupations as innkeeper, trader, muleteer, carter, soldier, and the like attract proportionately more Moslems than Chinese. The Chinese, on the other hand, tend to monopolize the handicraft occupations. They make the best carpenters, silversmiths, blacksmiths, masons, and tailors. There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, Moslems prepare and make up furs, probably because the handling of sheep and lambskins was closely associated with the butchering trade which, except for pork, is Moslem. Second, the Turks in Sinkiang are good carpet weavers. "The Turkestan carpet-weavers practice a family trade, using cow or camel hair in natural and in dyed shades. The boys sit before the handloom and weave very rapidly, with no apparent pattern to follow. They are working out the conventional design which has been done by their own family for many generations, for the patterns are traditional and no one would think of varying them." The Chinese show greater aptitude, at least greater preference, for the scholarly callings; they are school teachers, accountants (even in Moslem firms) doctors, engineers, and administrative officials in the civil service.

*563 184 621 162 The cooperation or division of labor is limited exclusively to the towns and cities. In the rural communities, the Moslems and Chinese have not chosen the way of tolerant cooperation. There is practically no strictly farming village which has an equal mixture of the two groups; in every case the village is predominantly one or the other. Generally, the population is composed almost entirely of one group with only a few hangers-on of the other. In the basic occupation of the village - farming - cooperation is found (578) only among people of the same racial group. Between the Chinese and the Moslems the rivalry is of sufficient intensity to eliminate or segregate one of the parties. There are villages in which live both Chinese and Chinese Moslems although in very small number. In every case, however, the representation of the two groups is not numerically equal, but is predominantly one or the other.

*563 463 621 578 Unless the occupations of the minority are specialized and not coveted by members of the dominant group, there is always the phenomenon of the majority group attempting to usurp the callings or occupational opportunities of the minority group and hoping that the minority group eventually will leave the community. Under such conditions, antagonisms always exist between the two groups in the same farm community.

*563 621 184 The Chinese in the predominantly Tibetan districts are organized in exactly the same way as the Chinese in the predominantly Chinese Moslem areas. Again the village is the important unit of organization, the village organization is integrated in the county, and the village authorities are answerable to the county magistrate. [651] These Chinese villages are taxed far more heavily than the Tibetan villages. The Tibetan villages, in many aspects are similar to the [361] Chinese villages. Generally, the Chinese villages are in predominantly Chinese sections while the Tibetan villages are in predominantly Tibetan country. But some of the Chinese villages are quite far up in Tibetan country. In their culture these conform more to the Tibetan pattern than to the Chinese. In both groups the village is of supreme importance as a social and political unit [162] of organization. The villages are much alike in size, the average village having a population of between twenty and thirty families.

In organization and function the Chinese and Tibetan villages show differences. Within the organization of the Chinese village there is not only a compact family unit but a clan system as well. The sedentary Tibetans, on the other hand, have no clearly defined clan organization, and their family is much looser than among the Chinese. Nevertheless, the Chinese village organization permits a considerable degree of individualism, whereas the Tibetan village communal activity completely overshadows individual activity. This is probably because the Chinese family and clan compete with the village organization, thereby acting as a check on the exercise of village authority. It may be that Chinese frontier life necessarily entails greater liberty of action and individual initiative. In everything related to communal properties and communal activities, as well as in all matters regulating the time of planting, harvesting, etc., the Tibetan village acts with a solidarity and unanimity that is comparatively lacking in a Chinese village community in the same area. In spite of these differences, the subsistence routine is substantially the same for the Chinese farmer and the Tibetan farmers, and the village of the one has a close resemblanc to that of the other.

*563 628 179 Although there is a great deal of culture contact between the Chinese and Tibetans in the same areas, an interesting feature is that contact is quite one-sided. The agents, almost without exception, are Chinese. The contact can be called reciprocal only to the

V. The Tibetans of Chinghai

A. The Family Organization

581 Among the Tibetans of Northwest China almost any form of
59 marriage that will further the family interests is acceptable.
51 Property and the problems of serving it, avoiding its division, and
*563 increasing it, seem to underlie most marital variations. Monogamy, polygyny, and fraternal polyandry exist with various modifications, and the nuclear structure of the family differs accordingly. The most common and least complicated arrangement in
*563 this region is that of a husband, his wife, and their unmarried
592 children. The family may also include several grandchildren born
[848] to unwed daughters. Considerable freedom is allowed to young
[836] people before marriage and their offspring are accepted without reservation. Sons often will stay with their parents after marriage,
[591] and sons often bring their wives into the family and remain with their parents. A daughter also may bring her husband into her
*563 family, but this occurs generally when the family has no sons.
583 The Mag pa (male bride) suffers no disgrace. He joins his wife's
591 family, and if the family is sinified to the extent of having a family name, takes her family name. He calls her relatives his own, severs all relations with his own family, and assumes all the duties and rights of a son.

*563 Where polygyny occurs, the unit will include one or more addi-
595 tional wives, who will each live in her own tent, if the husband is rich enough, and if they do not get along together. Polyandry is not uncommon. In this case, the nuclear family includes the head of the household (the eldest married son), his brothers, his wife (or wives) and the children who are all considered his offspring, regardless of which brother is the actual father. Parents usually
*563 retire to their own separate dwelling, as soon as their eldest son
593 marries, and leave him the authority and the responsibilities of the head of the house.

*563 Tibetan families are not as large as either the Chinese or the
● 162 Turkic. There are many attempts to explain this phenomenon, such as the prevalence of venereal diseases which have reduced their productivity considerably. Some refer to the hardships of rearing children in such a difficult and hostile climate, some claim the desire to space until child "no longer needs milk" (ca. 4 yrs), others blame the facts of polyandry and the celebacy of a large portion of the male population.

*563 The focus of the family is on the sons, who provide for the con-
593 tinuity of the family . There is much greater degree of stability
3 and permanency in the Tibetan family than there is in the Turkic
182 family. Sons can fulfill obligations to the State, such as military service and tax collecting. They help to preserve estates and

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3. Kansu: The educational program was more advanced than in the other provinces in the Northwest. The number of schools and students as of 1945 was as follows:

Table 4

No. of Schools and Students in Kansu, 1945*

	Teachers	Students
1. Middle Schools		
a. Under Provincial Bureau of Education		
(1) Hsia-ho Normal School		112
b. Private		
(1) Northwest Middle School, Lan-chou	25	211
(2) Ch'ing-yun Middle School, Wu-wei	28	314
(3) Yun-t'ing Middle School, Lin-hsia	11	74
(4) K'uei-feng Middle School, Lin-hsia	9	68
2. Primary Schools		
a. Border Region Nationality Schools 12 schools	85	2,124
b. County (Hsien) Nationality Schools 129 schools	313	7,198

3. One mobile team of teachers for Mongols in northern Kansu

*(Ministry of Education, "Education in the Border Regions," 1948.)

II. Chinese Education in Pre-Communist Times

A. Education under the National Government

During recent decades, the education in Northwest China has been backward compared to that in the coastal provinces. The educational standards within Northwest China also differed greatly. Generally speaking, the farther the people lived from the big cities, the less they were educated.

Even though the general Chinese school system was introduced also to the Northwest, in remote places the so-called schools were scarcely different from the old-fashioned tutor system.

The provincial authorities were handicapped by the shortage of funds as they struggled to set up schools with what little was appropriated to them by the Central Government. In 1935, the Central Government appropriated half a million dollars for border education, and within two years the following schools were established:

In Kansu: A training class for village teachers and fifty-five primary schools.

In Chinghai: A normal school for the teaching of Mongolian and Tibetan at Hsining, two middle schools, 143 primary

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Table 5
Primary Education in the Northwest in 1945

Province	Complete primary schools	Proportion to Hsiang and Chen	Junior primary schools	Proportion to pao	Total schools	Students Children	Students Adult
Shensi	1,137	1.2 school to 1 Hsiang or Chen	12,591	1.77 school to 1 pao	13,979*	852,237	512,519
Kansu	821		6,551	2 schools for 3 pao	7,372	398,260	173,133
Ninghsia	86	3 schools for 5 Hsiang or Chen	357	2 schools for 5 pao	443	36,509	16,754
Chinghai	195	.83 school for 1 Hsiang or Chen	752	.78 school for 1 pao	947	51,535	33,112
Sinkiang	201	1 school for 6 Hsiang or Chen**	677	1 school for 4 pao**	2,694**	298,600	45,500

* Including provincial, private and other schools.
** Including 1,515 private schools.
(Ministry of Education: The Second Educational Year Book, 1948.)

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LABOR

I. "Free Labor

N 464 Information on labor conditions in the Northwest is very scanty. However, there are indications that the Communists have faced a very serious problem of labor shortage in that N [162] area. To begin with, the Northwest is a very sparsely populated area. It embraces about one third of China's territory, but its population is only about six percent of the national total. If any large scale reconstruction works are to be effected, it seems to be necessary to use outside labor supplies. More- N [801] over, educational standards in the Northwest have been relatively N low. Consequently, the quality of native labor is also a problem.

464 To overcome these difficulties, the Communists have adopted *668 several methods. One is to encourage or force skilled and 177 semi-skilled labor in other parts of the country to work in the 167 Northwest. For instance, the communication department of [466] Sinkiang in May, 1955, absorbed some 409 automobile drivers S and mechanics from among the demobilized servicemen in [464] Shantung and Honan for reconstruction work in the border 066 regions. In March, 1955, 200 cadres of Hui nationality of the People's Liberation Army Railway Corps have been transfered to work in the Hui-nationality areas in Kansu and Chinghai. Most of these cadres have passed through the Anti-Japanese "War of Liberation," land reform and Anti-U.S. and Aid-Korea campaigns. Of these ninety percent are party members or members of the Communist Youth League.

In late 1954, four thousand skilled building workers and technicians from other cities have signed up for work in Sian. They began to arrive from Shanghai, Wuhan, Canton and other places in early 1955, and they were warmly welcomed by the local authorities. All this shows that outside labor has played a very important part in the economic reconstruction in the Northwest (See also section Population).

II. Army Labor

S 464 Another method is to use the army as a labor force. This 701 has been particularly important in Sinkiang, in which the 708 People's Liberation Army have participated in many reconstruction 668 projects. To take 1955 as an example, they were engaged in 177 the following tasks:

A March 24, 1955, despatch reports: "The People's Liberation Army farming units in Sinkiang have started their afforestation program in the south of this province. This year they plan to plant trees on 1,200 hectares, mostly shelter belts to protect reclaimed farmland."

fication of a non-Moslem is not likely to be a very spontaneous movement on the part of the Turkic people, nor is it conceivable that they "deeply love and warmly support the Central People's Government." To most of them it is a remote government in a foreign country - China - to which most of them have never been, and it is very difficult for them to visualize it as the government to whom they owe supreme allegiance.

Direct authority is represented by the local government bodies. Although composed of many Chinese officials, the representatives of the local population fill prominent positions in the local government also. There is a certain amount of pride felt by the local people owing to the fact that some of the important leaders are Turkic Moslems, who have achieved a position of importance in the government. It is quite likely that leaders like Burkhan and Saifuddin are quite popular among the Turks of Sinkiang. The Turkic refugees abroad and the strongly nationalistic-minded ones who still are in Sinkiang, look at these leaders participating in the Chinese Communist regime as traitors cooperating with the oppressive powers, rather than national heroes.

II. The Mongols of the Northwest

A. Introductory Remarks

Northwest China is the arena for some 150,000 Mongolian herdsmen. Although uniform in respect to their Buddhistic-nomadic culture and language (with the exception of the Monguors who speak a Mongolian-Tibetan mixed dialect) they do not constitute a political or areal unit, living as they do thousands of miles apart, in the northeastern area of Sinkiang, around the Tsaidam swamps area, in the Edzingol area, in the northern part of Kansu and even in some enclaves in Shensi. Since Chingis Khan, they have never constituted a political unit, although Legdan Khan united the major parts of them into a short-lived empire (see Historical Setting).

The reason for this lack of unity is first and above all, the fact that the Mongols of the Northwest area are outnumbered by Chinese (30 million) and Turks (4 million). The second reason is the treatment by the Manchus who shifted the Mongol banners from place to place in connection with the Manchu, Sibo, and Solon banners, who constituted the main and more reliable garrisons in the frontier area. The reliability of the Mongolian garrisons was partly due to the policy toward the banner and tribal leaders who were made wang (king) or nobles of various ranks.

B. Views of the People with Respect to their own Country

The average Mongol of the Northwest is fully aware of the fact that he belongs to a minority and that all he possesses are his

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

*563 621 184 individual activity. In all matters relating to the village-owned woodlands and pasturelands, as well as in all matters regulating the time of planting, harvesting, etc., the Tibetan village acts with a solidarity and unanimity that is comparatively lacking in a Chinese village community, although that community also owns communal wood lots and pastures.

*563 722 727 The sedentary Tibetans in the Northwest, according to Ekvall, were quite friendly toward the Chinese. The Tibetan country with which Ekvall is familiar "has again and again been a most effective refuge for those fleeing from the three great Mohammedan rebellions" and from other local troubles. The Tibetans, like many unsophisticated peoples, are rather soft-hearted toward refugees, especially if they be destitute. By Tibetan custom the right of refuge has become one of the basic rights, and when it is reinforced by the claims of acquaintance and the functioning of the "guest-host" system this right of refuge can open a path into the most exclusive of Tibetan communities.

*563 • 162 [562] The sedentary Tibetans are short of males. For this reason, in every instance intermarriage is between a Chinese man and a Tibetan woman - never between a Tibetan man and a Chinese woman. This means that the Tibetans put more value on their men than on their women. They can afford to give up a woman, but not a man.

829 *668 177 Attitudes of the Chinese in the Northwest toward the present regime again differ widely. The so-called Shen-Kan-Ning Border Area was the core area of the Yenan regime. Communist policies and maneuvers were experienced here for almost a decade and a half before they were applied to other parts of China. It will be remembered that the strategy of the Yenan period differed considerably from later usages. An initially sceptically favorable attitude of the rural population seemed at that time justified. Those who joined the party or the army did so with enthusiasm and a sense of mission. (Compare, however, section Political Dynamics on their later fate). Regions outside the Border Areas did not enjoy this "privilege". To the pronounced conservatism of the rural population in other parts of Shensi and Kansu, Communist innovations which were in contrast to their traditions and interests came as a heavily felt shock. Their passivity and submissiveness on the other hand kept them from voicing open discontent. Apathy would probably be the right term to represent the rural people's attitude toward the new regime. [159]

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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

I. Historical Background

Political life in China's Northwest, a region which in area comprises one-third of China but with a population that comes to less than six per cent of China's population, is complicated by the dissimilitudes of the geographical components and diversity of its population. Joined by the narrow neck of Kansu province, it is virtually two widely divergent regions. Historically, the problem and basic cause of conflict have been the attempts of the eastern or Chinese end of the vast region to dominate the western or non-Chinese end, and the resistance and struggle for autonomy of the non-Chinese peoples in the west against the domination of the Chinese in the east.

East of the narrow passage of Kansu is Shensi and southern Kansu, a region densely populated by Chinese, forming an integral part of China and subject to all the political vicissitudes of China. This region was the base of strong dynasties in the past not only for the conquest of China but also for the extension of power to the west. The Chinese Communists, who had a nucleus in this region since 1931, considerably expanded their control since 1935 when they established their Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region with headquarters at Yenan. From 1935 to 1947 this region was the center of the Communist revolution, and the laboratory of Communist experiments in government and in the mobilization of the people. After 1949, when the Communists moved their capital to Peiping, the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region became one of their many "old liberation areas," and their base for their domination of the Northwest. The headquarters of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council (later the Northwest Administrative Council) as well as the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP were located at Sian.

Westward, beyond the Kansu Corridor is Sinkiang, a huge dominion which, in accessibility and in economic ties is more closely oriented to Soviet Central Asia than to China. During the past century, the province had been the amphitheater for a three-way tug-o'war among China, Russia and Britain, and for a time in the 1930's, this was further complicated by the machinations of the Japanese. The conglomeration of the inhabitants of Chinese Turkestan, three-quarters of whom are Uighurs, a Moslem Turkic people, are split along racial, regional, religious, cultural and political lines and disunited by historical and traditional antipathy, present wide differences of interests and aspiration. Even in their opposition to Chinese domination and in their striving for self-rule, which they share in common, they rarely presented a united front. The history of the Northwest is thus a prolix story of attempts of the Chinese to assert their political dominance and the

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Table 2

NATIONAL MINORITY CADRES TRAINED IN THE NORTHWEST

Sinkiang			
Veterans of the Ili Revolt			17,000
Graduates of 25 training classes in 1950			3,600
Graduates of the training classes in 1951			1,200
Graduates of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau cadre school in 1951, 1044, 84 per cent were natives			877
Graduates of the Sinkiang Nationality College, 1953			1,700
Educational Cadres, from Sinkiang Cadre School			4,355
Graduates of the training classes in 1954			200
Graduates of the Provincial Government Cadre School			296
Cadres promoted from activists			
In 197 hsiang	308		
In Ili, Kashgar and Yarkand	934		
In Bavenkara NAA	80		
In Qizil Su Kolkhoz NAA	1,100		2,422
Total	2,422		
Total			31,650
Ninghsia, summer 1954,			2,300
Kansu, Graduates of the Lanchou Nationality College, 1950-54			2,500
Chinghai			
Number as of summer, 1954		3,471	
Cadres promoted from activists			
Yu-shu Tibetan NAA	250		
Huang-nan Tibetan NAA	258		
Hai-pei Tibetan NAA	302		
Mongol-Tibetan-Kazakh NAA	340		
Shun-hua Salar NAA	190		
Total	1,340	1,340	
Total		4,811	4,811
Shensi, Graduates of the Northwest Nationality College at Sian, 1950-54			2,543
GRAND TOTAL FOR THE NORTHWEST			43,834

This figure, 43,834, is not far from the figure of "over 40,000 cadres of national minorities" cited by Wang Feng, chairman of the Commission of Nationality Affairs of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and director of the Department of United Front Work of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in December, 1953 (NCNA, January 6, 1954).

As to the total number of cadres in the Northwest, it is necessary to deduce from the statistics given in the Communist press to obtain an estimate. In September, 1955, Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, claimed that there were 36,000 national minority

cadres in the province (JMJP September 24, 1955), but this appeared to be an exaggeration, for an article in the Kuang-ming jih-pao, (by Chang Hung, on September 30, 1955), stated that the number of minority cadres in Sinkiang was 34,400, and that they made up 66.9 per cent of all the cadres in the then province. The total, therefore, comes to 51,543. In Kansu, the total number of cadres up to the end of 1953 was 12,361. In Chinghai, the 3,471 national minority cadres made up 40 per cent of the total number of cadres, so that the total number would be about 8,500.

Early in 1950, Hsi Chung-hsün, vice-chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, stated that there were 50,000 underground cadres plus 200,000 cadres in the People's Liberation Army, or a total of 250,000. Later in the year, it was stated that over 10,000 students and former government functionaries were undergoing reform in the Northwest Cadre Training School, and that 6,000 of them were from the national minorities. A large number of these cadres were purged in 1952-53, but their ranks were filled by graduates from the training schools and colleges. The Northwest Cadre School at Sian, graduated 2,200 in the years 1949-53 and the Northwest Revolutionary University, also at Sian, graduated a total of 12,000 in the period from 1950 to 1953.

Simultaneous with the process of drawing men from schools and government offices into the special training classes, nationality colleges and cadre schools for training non-Chinese cadres were also assigned jobs in lower levels of the governments so that they could receive practical experience in the administration and also to bear the brunt of contact with local inhabitants. By fall of 1950, there were about 4,400 native cadres employed in local government agencies, half of whom held offices above the level of hsiang. By spring of 1951, according to incomplete figures, the number of national minority cadres in government increased to 22,000, distributed in the five Northwest provinces as follows, (NCNA, May 13, 1951):

Sinkiang	17,000
Chinghai	2,000
Kansu	1,976
Ninghsia	1,050
Sian Municipality	40

The 17,000 administrative personnel in Sinkiang were the same veteran cadres who took part in the 1944 Ili Revolt and who were organized into the Sinkiang People's Democratic League headed by Saifuddin (JMJP, June 6, 1952; also statement of Wang Feng, December 29, 1951). It was also claimed that seventy to eighty per cent of the personnel in the magistrates' offices in the 80 counties of Sinkiang were native cadres. By the end of 1951, the number of national minority cadres employed in government work

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*175 in the Northwest reached the highwater mark of 27,000 (NCNA
*668 January 8, 1952).
*563 A large number of the cadres were sent out directly from
• 162 training schools to low-ranking positions in the people's govern-
631 ments. Up to the summer of 1953 the Northwest Revolutionary
[873] University at Sian placed over 12,000 of its graduates in govern-
[894] ment service, the Northwest Nationality College 2,573, the Lanchou
S Nationality College 2,500, and the Northwest Cadre School 2,200.
175 The areas of concentration in Sinkiang were the Ili and Kashgar
668 Administrative Districts and three counties in Yarkand which had
563 6,907 native cadres employed as directors of departments, sec-
162 tion chiefs, and heads of counties and ch'ü (districts).
631

B. Demoralization and Conflict of the Cadres

N
*175 A compelling reason for the large-scale induction of cadres,
*668 both Chinese and from the national minorities, was not only because
578 of the small number of veteran cadres, but also because these old cadres were no longer considered trustworthy and useful by the authorities. However, the authorities soon found that the new cadres were not any better and their absorption only heightened the conflict within the ranks of the cadres. The defects of the cadres were repeatedly pointed out in the series of conferences convened by the Department of United Front Work of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 1951 and in the spring of 1952. The main shortcomings of the cadres, as pointed out by the Communist leaders, were:

1. Lack of political consciousness and demoralization of the old party cadres. It was significant, and perhaps paradoxical, that the major criticisms against the cadres were directed against the veteran cadres who had been trained and who had seen service in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, which since 1935 had been the center of Communist activities and the showcase of Communist administration. As early as January, 1950, Ma Wen-jui, director of the Organization Department of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, charged in a speech (JMJP January 4, 1950),that the old cadres showed restlessness, they wanted better jobs and were anxious to return home, they suffered from the ideological defects of individualism and jealousy of the new cadres, they were inefficient and careless in their work so that they lost important documents and often divulged state secrets, they lacked initiative and a sense of responsibility, and sought only enjoyment. Cases of graft were quite frequent.

Eighteen months later, at a conference of high-ranking cadres held at Sian in August, 1951, Ma Wen-jui charged that the old party cadres, due to their long stay in the rural villages and due to the demoralizing conditions of the war, lack education. "The degrees of political awakening of some of the party members is

S
175 problem is no longer one concerned with opposition to pan-racial-
668 ism (i.e., Great Hanism), but rather how to cooperate with the...
563 Chinese in struggling for the building of a free big family and in
631 opposing petty nationalism and the saboteurs of national solidarity."
(JMJP October 2, 1951).

N 3. Up to the end of 1953, it was reported that there were a total
*175 of 2,800,000 organized peasant households in the Northwest, or
592 45 per cent of the total number of peasant households (Ch'un-chung
• 162 jih-pao, January 1, 1954). The bulk of the number of organized
S peasants were in the interior provinces, while in Sinkiang only
175 33.8 per cent of the peasant households were organized. Not only
592 the percentage in Sinkiang, but also the average percentage of the
162 whole of the Northwest, compared rather unfavorably with the
77.32 per cent in Inner Mongolia.

N The figures on Table 4 are numbers of farming households in
[494] the Northwest, which were organized into farmers associations
[406] and into mutual aid teams up to December, 1953, based on statis-
tics appearing in the Communist press. (Figures in parentheses
are computed from percentages given of the total).

S 4. An important factor, too, was the special position of Soviet
175 Russia in Sinkiang. Soviet authorities had succeeded in gaining a
648 foothold in Chinese Turkestan during the administration of Sheng
Shih-ts'ai and later in the political vacuum attendant upon the
withdrawal of Nationalist influence in 1948-49. Soviet troops were
stationed at strategic points and Soviet party and consular officials
actually held the reins of power. Soviet interests were confirmed
in the treaty signed between Peking and Moscow in February, 1950,
to which were attached two codicils providing for the organization
of two joint stock companies for Soviet exploitation of the oil and
mineral resources in Sinkiang (not excluding the possibility of the
mining and shipment of uranium ores to the Soviet Union). To
implement these agreements, large numbers of Soviet experts
arrived to set up machine works, power plants, and to assist the
Chinese in the work of geological survey, veterinary and medical
research, the operation of trucking lines and state farms, cotton
production, insect eradication and sheep-raising (NCNA interview
with Burkhan, Kuang-ming Jih-pao, September 27, 1955). In the
face of Soviet domination of Sinkiang, it was difficult for Communist
China to assert its rule, except nominally, in that remote province.

It was with the death of Stalin that there was, ostensibly, a
reappraisal of Soviet relations with Communist China. During the
visit of Nikita Khruschev and Nikolai Bulganin to Peking in October,
1954, the pattern of Sino-Soviet partnership was readjusted to make
it more palatable to the ego of the Chinese leaders. In regard to
Sinkiang, one of the five agreements reached as a result of the
Peking talks was for the sale of Soviet shares in the two joint
stock companies to Communist China, transforming them into

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 513]

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Table 4. ORGANIZATION OF THE PEASANTS IN THE NORTHWEST UP TO DECEMBER, 1953
(Based on Communist statistics)

	Total Population (1953 census)	Organized Farming Households		Mutual Aid Teams	Permanent Mutual Aid Teams		Agricultural Producers Cooperatives	State Farms
		Number	Percentage of total farming households		Number	Percentage of Total No. of Teams		
Northwest China	35,358,000	2,800,000	45 %				305	
Shensi	15,881,000	1,424,800	47 %	280,848	34,381	12.2%	234	93
Kansu (including Ninghsia)	12,929,000		45 %	194,400	19,400	10 %	32	50
Ninghsia (721,000)			53 %	13,615	2,535	16 %	19	-
Chinghai	1,677,000	96,000	52.3%	25,106	1,840	7.3%	10	-
Sinkiang	4,874,000	299,000	33.8%	51,600	(2,500)	5 %	10	-

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AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK

I. The Pre-Communist Period

A. Introduction

Since the Chinese Communist Party came to power, its interest in the Northwest, as an area for economic development, has increased. The Communists feel that this vast region of 1,232,074 square miles, which is roughly one-third of the total area of China (3,657,765 square miles), offers unlimited opportunities for economic development. They claim that vast mineral deposits exist, that agriculture can be greatly expanded, and that the Northwest might serve as an outlet for some of the heavily populated sections of China Proper. Of China's total population of 582,605,000 million people, only 35,360,000 reside in the Northwest (Shensi: 15,881,000; Kansu and Ninghsia: 12,928,000; Chinghai: 1,677,000; and Sinkiang: 6,874,000). These figures are from the 1953 census report.

Since 1949, the Communists have begun to develop this area as rapidly as their limited capital and technological resources permit. Though the development of agriculture is only one aspect of their program, it is the foundation on which Communist planning in the Northwest rests.

B. Sinkiang

1. The geographical setting

Sinkiang is enclosed on the north, south, and west by mighty mountain masses and on the eastern side by wide stretches of barren plateau and is bisected by the lofty Tienshan, or Heavenly Mountains, which rise to heights of 23,000 feet and extend across the province from west to east, dividing the region into two unequal parts. The southern area, two-thirds of the whole, is the Tarim Basin, the land of oases and deserts. The northern part is Dsungaria, traditionally the land of the nomads. The total area of the province is about 600,000 square miles, or twice the size of Texas.

In the Tarim Basin, named from the east flowing river of the same name, is one of the world's driest deserts, the Takla Makan, which at its lowest point is actually below sea level. Vegetation is almost non-existent, so that nomadism is impossible except on a few alluvial fans where water lies near enough to the surface to support grass. The average rainfall is less than four inches a year. Water comes from the mountains which fringe the desert on the north, west and south. From the melting upland snows and glaciers, rivers cut their way down to the central oval desert. Where each river leaves the foothills, men dig canals to spread the water out in a fan, forming an oasis, so that the edige of the desert along the foot of the mountains is dotted by a series of oases.

241 489 culture on land already under cultivation might be realized.

The Nationalist Government gave no financial assistance of 241 654 175 any magnitude until the Second World War. Finally, when it was forced to retreat into the remote areas of Southwest China, the government had to depend largely on the Northwest for food and revenue (agricultural taxes). The Nationalist Government became more interested in the agricultural development of the Northwest and some experimental stations were set up in Kansu. Government assistance, however, was directed primarily to farmers engaged in producing crops for the war effort; e.g., cotton.

241 175 [435] After 1938, the price index for farm products rose rapidly in all four provinces and the purchasing power of the farmers began to grow. After 1940, food prices rose speedily and the farmers had more money than in prewar days. By examination of the [433] data of the war years as to whether farmers undertook to increase their scale of production and thereby extend cultivation, we can say that there was little increase in extensive farming (except in the case of Ninghsia) and that the output increases during this period can be attributed (wheat especially) largely to intensive farming.

241 423 Turning to the land tenure system, the percentage of farmers who are owners, partowners and tenants, as determined by a land survey undertaken by J. L. Buck, reveals that on the average most of the farmers own their own plots of land. The following [175] chart, compiled from data collected by Buck in 1933 on a sample basis gives us the landholding breakdown. In Farm Survey (a), [429] farmers who own their farmsteads but who rent all their crop land are classified as tenants rather than as partowners. When compared to the agricultural survey (b), (in this survey, 236 localities, 146 hsien, and twenty provinces in China were examined), the results in both cases are similar except in the case of Chinghai where the few samples taken disallows an accurate breakdown. (Land Utilization in China p. 57.)

241 423 427 Percentage of farmers who are owners, partowners and tenants

Province & local	Farm Survey (a)			Agricultural Survey (b)		
Kansu	owner	part-owner	tenant	owner	part-owner	tenant
Kao-lan	86.0	11.0	3.0	60.0	15.0	25.0
Lin-hsia	-	-	-	60.0	10.0	30.0
Wu-wei	96.0	4.0	0	60.0	25.0	15.0
Yung-teng	-	-	-	35.0	5.0	60.0
Ping-liang	82.0	17.0	1.0	85.0	10.0	5.0
Tien-shu	62.0	21.0	17.0	50.0	30.0	20.0
Average	78.6	14.2	7.2	58.4	15.8	25.8
Ninghsia	98.0	2.0	0	96.0	1.0	3.0
Chinghai						
Hwang-yau	67.3	22.7	10.0	-	-	-

Kuei-teh	-	-	-	30.0	10.0	60.0
Hsi-ning	77.8	19.4	2.8	-	-	-
Wei-yüan	-	-	-	10.0	5.0	85.0
Average	72.6	20.5	6.4	20.0	7.5	72.5
Shensi						
Ting-pien	72.0	20.0	8.0	-	-	-
Yu-lin	66.0	26.0	8.0	-	-	-
Average for 20 locals	69.8	16.0	14.0	70.0	14.1	15.9
Average	69.4	20.6	10.0	70.0	14.1	15.9

The following charts are the results of agricultural surveys taken during the war years by the Nationalist Government. They are on a percentage basis and bear out the validity of Buck's findings; namely, that tenantry in the Northwest is not a serious problem. It is dangerous to try and depict any trend from these statistics; although this period reflects a higher standard of living for the peasantry because of high wartime prices, it usually takes a long time to bring about any change in landed relations, since peasant attitudes are fixed and not susceptible to immediate change. (China Handbook 1937-1945, pp. 458-59, revised and enlarged with 1946 Supplement.)

Percentage of tenant farmers in China

Province	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Ninghsia	18	21	16	10	15	14	15	13
Chinghai	19	18	18	21	24	28	18	21
Kansu	19	16	22	18	18	21	22	18
Shensi	18	22	25	22	23	25	21	24

Percentage of owner farmers in China

Province	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Ninghsia	68	66	65	74	74	74	78	68
Chinghai	51	61	58	61	51	51	78	58
Kansu	61	66	59	62	61	60	55	63
Shensi	61	57	55	58	57	56	59	58

Percentage of part-owner farmers in China

Province	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Ninghsia	14	13	19	16	11	12	7	19
Chinghai	30	21	24	18	25	21	27	21
Kansu	20	18	19	20	21	19	19	19
Shensi	21	21	20	20	20	19	20	18

There are three systems for paying land rent; namely, cash rent, crop rent, and share rent. When a tenant rents his land by paying a fixed amount of money per mou to his landlord, it is cash rent. If he pays a fixed amount of cereals produced on the land, it is crop rent. If he divides the crops raised on his rented land with his landlord at a fixed ratio, it is share rent. No investigations were made during World War II regarding the systems of paying rent. The latest study was made in 1934 by the National

conditions in 1954 and tasks for 1955, it was stated that 2,000 modern plows were now in use, and 67,245 mou (10,221 acres) of dry fields have been converted into water fields, while adequate water supply has also been made available to 28,597 mou (4,347 acres) of original water fields. It was planned to have 746 agricultural producer co-ops in operation in 1955, with an area of 5,115,000 mou (777,480 acres) to be sowed with a planned output for the province of 853,350,948 carries (42,337,207 bushels). An area of 500,000 mou (76,000 acres) is to be sown for oil bearing crops with a planned output of 10 million catties (24,137 metric tons). There is so little data for the pre-Communist and Communist period that it is impossible to construct a table. The only comparison that can be made is in oil seed bearing crops (and livestock which follows). The pre-Communist figures give an average of 21,000 metric tons for the years 1931-1939. Since it is planned to increase output to 24,137 metric tons, this will mean an increase of 3,137 metric tons; not a very significant increase.

In Chinghai there is a population of over one million; sixty per cent belong to the Tibetan, Mongolian, and Hui minority nationalities. The Communists reported that the province's seven million head of livestock in 1951 was increased to over twelve million in 1954 and it is planned that 20 million will be raised by 1957. (Pre-war and war year statistics list the total livestock at little over one million. Communists claims of sevenfold and twelvefold increases in this case, ought to be accepted with reservations. However, because the base year (one million) is so low, it is possible to have rapid increases of a relatively large magnitude.) The People's Government issued loans to husbandmen engaged in animal husbandry totalling 6,555,000,000 yuan (U.S. $266,365) in 1954. Steps were taken in cutting and storing grass for winter, repairing sheds and enclosures, and building winter and spring shelters to protect livestock during the cold season. It was also reported that in 1954, goals in planned purchases of cattle and sheep were achieved, and this produced definite contributions in support of the industrial construction of the State. At the same time, these activities served to educate the people in patriotism and mutual aid.

Tasks for the future were to continue to raise agricultural production based on the mutual aid and producer co-ops and to develop supply and marketing co-ops, credit co-ops, and arrange for markets in rural areas to promote interflow of supplies and planned purchase and planned supply of food. Care was to be taken to preserve livestock and to continue afforestation schemes. It was reported that within the province some 38,900 mou (5,913 acres) had been afforestated in 1954 and the number of fires greatly reduced.

2: Teichman G-5 (1919) 1921 AF13 Northwest China AF13

the south, runs for two hours' march across the flat-topped hills, descending finally by precipitous zigzags to reach the city of Yich'uan lying in the narrow valley of a stream flowing east to join the Yellow River. The country crossed on this march is again pure loess, very sparsely populated, and with innumerable grass-grown terraces which have gone out of cultivation and render evident the depopulation of the region.

Yich'uan Hsien, lying at the junction of two narrow valleys in the loess, is the capital of a second class district, and was evidently a comparatively large and prosperous city in the past. At the time of our visit it was practically empty, and lying in the heart of that wild and little frequented region which contains the chief haunts of the brigand bands of Northern Shensi, it is at the present time uninhabitable by any but the poorest classes. Northern Shensi, depopulated by the Mahomedan rebellion fifty years ago, and now probably undergoing a process of desiccation, is losing its few remaining inhabitants of the better class through the devastations of the brigands, many having moved across the Yellow River into Shansi, where conditions are much better. Recently a large band of brigands, perhaps finding that Northern Shensi was getting rather bare, also moved across the river; but prompt military measures were taken by the Shansi authorities and they were soon driven back to their original haunts with great loss. The question naturally arises, why should these brigands be left apparently unmolested by the authorities of their own province?

The answer is provided by the history of events in Shensi during the years since the revolution of 1911, which is outlined in another chapter. The brigands of Northern Shensi are mostly ex-soldiers and Ko Lao Hui men, and are composed of the same material as the provincial troops, with whom they exchange rôles from time to time. It is therefore not possible to use the latter against them. Further, they constitute in a way the reserves of the provincial army, which are thus maintained without cost to the provincial Government. The Shensi soldier usually owns his own Mauser and as much ammunition as he can carry wound round and round his body in a cloth bandolier, acquired in the course of some previous rebellion or brigand raid,

favourably with many of the young magistrates in Shensi, promoted to their posts straight from the schools or the army through revolutionary influence, and without administrative experience of any kind.

P'ingliang, lying near the head of the Ching Ho valley at an altitude of over 4000 feet, is an important place, an agricultural market town in a wheat-growing region, and the administrative centre of Eastern Kansu. Being the seat of a Taoyin and a General, we had as usual a festive time during our short stay. The town, like most Kansu cities, is half empty, but the east suburb, the Mahomedan quarter, is busy and full of well-stocked shops. It was there that we first noticed the white caps of the Kansu Mahomedans, of whom we were to see so much during the next few months. The prosperity of the suburb compared to the city and their presence there were connected by the fact that until recently no Mahomedan was permitted to reside inside the walls of an official city in Kansu (one of the suppressive measures taken against them after the great rebellion); with the arrival of the republic, however, and its watchword of equality for the five races (Chinese, Mahomedans, Manchus, Tibetans, and Mongols), this disability was allowed to lapse. Frequent reference to the Mahomedans of the North West will be made in the following chapters, but the subject of Islam in China is an obscure and contentious one, and it should be noted that the statements here made are not the product of scientific enquiries, but merely the results of conversations with Chinese, mostly of the official classes, who, though sometimes Moslems themselves, were only acquainted with the superficial facts and popular traditions relating to the Mahomedans and their religion.

I estimate the Mahomedans of Kansu to constitute from a quarter to a third of the total population. They are freely scattered throughout the districts of the province as merchants, especially dealers in horses, but they are settled on the land more especially in two regions, in the South and the North respectively, roughly separated by the Great West Road. In the South they form a kind of Mahomedan wedge between the Chinese and the Tibetans of the Kokonor, centring round Hochou and Hsunhua on the Yellow River; in the North they extend from P'ingliang through Kuyuan, and Haich'eng to Chinchi (Ningling) and Ninghsia.

2: Teichman G-5 (1919) 1921 AF13 Northwest China AF13

through a sort of local government. In other parts of China the Mahomedans are mostly indistinguishable externally from the rest of the Chinese population; but in Kansu, apart from the Salas, who are of a distinctly Central Asiatic type, my experience was that the faces of most of the Mahomedans are somehow different from the Chinese; they are in any case usually rendered noticeable by their white caps. Foreign scholars attach importance to the early Arab intercourse by sea, but all the Chinese with whom I discussed the question of Islam in China agreed that it came overland from Central Asia, and this is probably true of the North and North West at any rate, which, apart from Yunnan, are the regions where Mahomedanism counts.

The Mahomedan population of Kansu, decimated by the great rebellion, is now recovering and increasing again as the result of many years of comparative peace. Apart from natural increase by births and, after the Chinese fashion, by adoptions, there are a certain number of conversions; these are due rather to expediency than to religious conviction, but the converts having once adopted Islam, appear usually to become good and zealous Moslems. The Chinese as a race seem to require stiffening by a virile religion of some kind, and the effects of Mahomedanism on the characters of those among them who embrace it appear remarkable, and give rise to curious speculations.

It may briefly be stated here that the Mahomedans of North West China, in spite of their religious connection with Turkey and the intrigues of enemy agents, have throughout the War remained absolutely loyal to the Chinese Government.

The relations between the Moslems and the foreign missionaries are comparatively good, so long as religious questions are not concerned. Even in religious matters they agree with the foreigner up to a certain point, since they consider that both they and the missionaries worship the only true God, in contrast to the idolatrous Chinese. It is only when the divinity of Jesus, whom they regard as a prophet but not divine, is raised that they join issue with the foreigner, and then they become inexorably hostile. The early history of Protestant missions in China contains many references to assistance received from the Mahomedans

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Tu ren

yüan bu. A single day's horseback ride took me there. (1) 361

1. Prschewalski's Yjam bu. In Prschewalski, Reisen in Tibet, translated by Stein, the Tu ren which I am about to describe are spoken of as Daldy, Doldy and Tunschen, and Prschewalski believes they originated in Samarkand and are a mixture of the Aryan and Mongolian race.

This Wei yüan bu is a little market town, ninety lis distant from 361
the city of Hsining fu toward the north-northeast, and is geologically 133
in the same red tertiary clay basin as the prefecture city of Hsining and the monastery Gum bum. The edge of the basin is about 10 kilometers beyond on the north and east and it is only there that one again finds granite and slate looming up out of the loess-covered tertiary. Thus, from north to south the width of the red clay of the Hsining fu basin is 50-60 kilometers. In modern times these red strata were split up into so many valleys and ravines that even this tertiary region has now become a bizarre mountain country. The material is so soft that the valley bottoms of the larger streams have been washed out to form wide beds. At the spot where Wei yüan bu is situated a large plain several square kilometers in size has been formed by the union of two such broad-bottomed, fruitful valleys. This undoubtedly accounts for the location and the importance of the place.

For, Wei yüan bu is an important town. It can even be called 361
a small city. It has a civil official who is now under the hsien of [624]
Hsining, it is the seat of a captain and second lieutenant, it has a city wall, a full half-dozen pawn shops, and all kinds of craftsmen. Above all there are important whiskey distillers among its inhabit- [274]
ants, who export their product as far as Lanchow and far into Tibet, and /246/ many mill owners whose mills, like those throughout East Tibet, are characterized by vertical axle trees and horizontally placed paddle wheels. In the census of 1895 the town had 820 fami- [162]
lies. For me Wei yüan bu was important as the present-day chief town and market-place of the Tu ren who are under the administra- [443]
tion of the hsien of Hsining.

Tu ren (tu jen) literally means "earth man." It is a Chinese 563
word and means "a resident." It refers to those people who were 167
already in the country before the last Chinese inundation. This last large immigration of Chinese began in the Mongol Dynasty (1260-1368) and still continues.

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Tu ren

563 (1260-1368) and still continues. The Tu ren of Wei yüan bu are a very
[779] peculiar little group. Many of them say they believe in only one
god. But, like the Chinese, they are also Buddhists. But besides
791 that they have shaman priests similar to the Bönbo, who are primari-
789 ly concerned with making the weather and exorcizing hail. On the
way from Hsining to Wei yüan bu one constantly comes across small
loam towers and numerous small heaps of stones which the hail
exorcisers have erected for the protection of the fields.

563 Most of the Tu ren men dress like Chinese, but some of them
[291] also wear, like the Tibetans, caftan-like wool skirts that reach
142 halfway to the ground and they wrap their legs up to the knees with
gray or blue bands like the poor people of North China. It is very
difficult, in fact, impossible, to distinguish a Tu ren from a
Chinese by the cast of his features or his build (Plate LIV). They
may be smaller on the average and have broader faces than the
Chinese. But just as among us Europeans one recognizes persons of
different nationalities only by certain external characteristics and
by their language, so it is with all the Mongoloid peoples at the
opposite end of Eurasia. There is no truly significant difference in
physical structure which would exclude misjudgment or confusion.

563 The men wore the Manchurian-Mongolian queue - which is
[302] taken for granted among faithful subjects of the emperor - and for
the rest they shaved just as much of their heads around this queue
[162] as the Chinese did. There are today still many thousands of them
(allegedly 20,000 families). In the Hsining prefecture alone the
number of their princes (tu se) equals more than 12, formerly it
[651] was 16 or 18. These princes receive gifts and land tax from their
subjects, administer justice and represent their subjects in dealings
with Chinese officials. They submitted as early as 1372 in the
fourth year of the reign of the first Ming emperor (Hung wu) and
[551] in return their old noble families were established. Beside their
Mongolian names they have Chinese surnames and three of their
tu se are called Li, two Ch'i, others Yi, Chen, Wang, Na Chao,
Chu, etc., and all of them have remained faithful since the Yüan
dynasty, just as though they were real Chinese. During the Mo-
hammedan rebelliions they suffered exactly like the Chinese.

563 There are also Tu ren living on the old highway between Lan-
342 chow and Hsining fu, in the region of the confluence of the Da
tung ho and the Hsining Ho, where they are scattered among
Chinese and Mohammedans in individual villages. These are

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Tu ren

167 Central Mongolia in the year 177 B.C. With the beginning
175 of the fourth century the Tu ku hun (formerly probably al-
563 ways pronounced Tu yü hun) appear with 1,100 families in Kansu and Koko Nor. As we said before, they are supposed to represent an eastern branch of the Hsiun nu and be of Turko-Mongolian origin. In the year 445 one of their khans conquered the wealthy city of Khotan in Turkistan and killed the king there. In 556 they withstood hard battles with the Turks who came from the north. Around 390 they numbered 15,000 families and in the course of the years they made repeated invasions deep into Chinese territory, until finally in 635 (after more than 300 years) the Chinese checked them. Shortly thereafter (663) they were vanquished by the Tibetans who resided in the south and whose tribes had just been united by the greatest Tibetan ruler, Srong btsan sgam bo. The Tibetans (the Tu fan of the Chinese chronicles) drove them from the succulent pastures of the Koko Nor and into the Nan Shan Mountains and their last king is said to have fled with the remains of his people from Nan Shan to Ning hsia where the tribe disappeared presumably around the year 672. But they are mentioned subsequently a few times in the Tang schu. Some of them must have been able to maintain themselves in Kansu.

162 The Tu ren are now domiciled not only around Wei yüan
563 bu (with about 3,000 families) but there are a few hundred
175 families south of the Hwang Ho near Bau ngan wedged in between Tibetans and Salar, while 2,000-3,000 more families live in San tschuan on the most inaccessible spot of the Hwang Ho below Hsün hoa ting, and 2,000 families live on the Da tung Ho; and in the extreme north the so-called Hoang fan or "yellow barbarians" in the valleys of Richthofen Ridge of the Nan Shan, on the upper course of the Edsingol, also
563 belong to them. These represent large remnants of peoples
175 which makes it obvious that they must at one time have belonged to something larger and better, and since the Chinese chronicles do not tell of any other peoples, except later on the Khoshot-Mongols, who founded an important kingdom, it almost follows that the Tu ren must be the remnants of the Tu ku hun. Later on they must also have formed part of the population of the Hsi Hsia kingdom which carried on long wars with the Chinese and Tibetans for the possession